Opinions

The District of Northern Illinois offers a database of opinions for the years 1999 to 2013, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.

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Judge Deborah L. Thorne

In re Ann Terrell
April 8, 2020

19-bk-07629

Judge LaShonda A. Hunt

18bk24734
Chapter 7 Trustee sought turnover of proceeds from debtors’ prepetition sale of their homestead, that they failed to reinvest before the one-year time limit expired.  Because the Trustee did not timely object to the exemption and the snapshot rule governs, the motion to compel turnover of funds is denied.

18bk18603
The standing chapter 13 trustee moved to modify the debtors’ confirmed plan to account for non-exempt funds received from a post-petition personal injury claim.  Debtors objected to any requirement to turn over payments after the 5-year maximum plan term in 11 U.S.C. § 1329(c) expires.  The court overruled the objection and granted the relief as requested.

Judge Thomas M. Lynch

18-82365, 19-96005
In adversary proceeding brought following Plaintiff’s ouster from retail joint venture, judgment entered in favor of Debtor following trial on objections to discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A) and § 523(a)(6) after finding, among other things, that (1) Plaintiff did not establish a debt owed to her by Debtor individually, as opposed to a potential claim against the limited liability company established by Debtor; (2) Plaintiff did not show either justifiable reliance on any alleged misrepresentation made by the Debtor or actual fraud with respect to their business venture; and (3) Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a willful and malicious injury attributable to the Debtor.

Judge Jack B. Schmetterer

15 B 38069, 17 A 00186

Judge Jacqueline P. Cox

In re Marcella Marie Mance
February 6, 2020

19 B 33057
In reliance on a recent ruling in In re Wigfall, 606 B.R. 784, the court avoided the City of Chicago’s lien on the Debtor’s vehicle after finding that it was a judicial lien subject to avoidance under Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.  The City contended that it was a statutory lien which Section 522(f) did not apply to.  Its lien was authorized by statute but the City cannot immobilize and seize vehicles until it obtains quasi-judicial determinations that its ordinances have been violated.

12 B 49219
The court denied Mar-Bow Value Partners’ motion for leave to reopen these jointly administered cases as an amicus to address McKinsey Recovery & Transformation’s Rule 2014 disclosures which were submitted several years ago to secure court appointment as the Debtors’ turnaround professional.  Mar-Bow contends that a fraud was committed on the court when McKinsey failed to disclose several conflicts of interests and other disqualifying information.  The court denied the requested relief, noting that Mar-Bow is too adversarial to serve as an amicus and that the United States Trustee is the best party to investigate the matters in issue.

Judge Donald R. Cassling

In re Louis John Capra
January 28, 2020

19 B 15935

Judge Janet S. Baer

18 B 28055
Debtor Fayyaz Karim (“Karim”) filed a motion for entry of an order of contempt against the Illinois Department of Revenue (“IDOR”), alleging that IDOR had violated the discharge injunction by attempting to collect a penalty debt that had been discharged in his chapter 7 bankruptcy case. The penalty debt at issue was imposed under the Illinois Cigarette Tax Act, 35 ILCS 130/1 et seq., which prohibits the possession of contraband cigarettes. According to Karim, the penalty was a tax penalty within the meaning of § 523(a)(7) and was discharged by operation of subsection (B) of that section, which provides for the discharge of tax penalties imposed with respect to a transaction or event that occurred more than three years before the petition date. IDOR responded by arguing that the penalty debt had not been discharged because it was either not a tax penalty within the meaning of § 523(a)(7) or, if the debt was a tax penalty within the meaning of the statute, because the penalty was imposed with respect to a transaction or event that occurred within three years of the petition date. The Court held that the penalty debt at issue was a tax penalty and that the relevant transaction or event for purposes of § 523(a)(7) occurred within three years of the petition date. As such, the Court found that the debt was nondischargeable and that IDOR thus did not violate the discharge injunction. Accordingly, the Court denied Karim’s motion for entry of an order of contempt.

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