Opinions

The District of Northern Illinois offers a database of opinions for the years 1999 to 2013, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.

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Chief Judge A. Benjamin Goldgar

In re Michael Hughes
December 16, 2020

18 B 11700

Judge Carol A. Doyle

Judge Donald R. Cassling

In re Wanda M. Williams
October 15, 2020

20 B 10324

Judge David D. Cleary

14 B 34232
Chapter 7 trustee objected to creditor’s proof of claim, asking the court to reclassify it from secured to unsecured and to reduce the amount.  Held: (1) an objection to claim was the proper procedural posture to resolve the matter; (2) due to the debtor’s delays, a state court citation proceeding did not expire prepetition, thus the creditor had a citation lien on the petition date; (3) nevertheless, the creditor waived its secured claim by its actions in the bankruptcy case; and (4) since the creditor was a landlord whose claim resulted from lease termination, 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) capped its claim.

Judge Timothy A. Barnes

08bk10095
Upon the vacation, in part, and remand by the District Court of this court’s order granting a motion seeking enforcement of this court’s confirmation order and damages arising from the alleged violation committed by the debtors’ prepetition surety, filed by successor to the purchaser of assets in the above-captioned bankruptcy cases, the District Court having confirmed that this court’s determination that the surety violated the injunction and release set forth in the court’s confirmation order and the debtors’ plan, but remanding for a determination of whether damages are appropriate under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in the since determined Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019), held: The evidence presented by the parties and undisturbed on appeal demonstrates that the surety’s actions were “persistent violations” and “persistent contumacy” of this court’s orders, shifting the burden to the surety to demonstrate that the surety’s belief that its pursuit of the purchaser was lawful is objectively reasonable. The surety has failed to demonstrate such. A finding of civil contempt is appropriate under Taggart and that the previously awarded actual damages for reduced property value, legal costs, consulting costs and project management costs remain supported. The motion remains GRANTED and this decision concludes the issues on remand.

Judge Thomas M. Lynch

In re Osvaldo Amaro
September 30, 2020

20-80051
In this chapter 7 case, the United States Trustee filed two motions to dismiss pursuant to sections 707(b)(2) and 707(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor objected to the motions and argued, as a preliminary issue of law, that the “means test” in section 707(b)(2) does not apply to cases like his that were commenced under chapter 13 and later converted to chapter 7. After reviewing a split in the authority over the meaning of the phrase “a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts” found in section 707(b)(1), the court agreed with the majority approach and concluded that a case originally filed under chapter 13 and subsequently converted to chapter 7 is subject to section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Declining the Debtor’s invitation to adopt the minority view, the court determined that approach would create “an enormous loophole to the means test” by limiting section 707(b) only to cases that were originally filed as chapter 7 cases.

19-82505, 20-96020
The court denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the adversary complaint filed by the chapter 7 trustee, which sought, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) and 735 ILCS 5/12-112, to avoid the Defendants’ transfer of their joint tenancy interest in their residence to a newly formed trust for which they are trustees and hold beneficiary interests in tenancy by the entirety. The complaint alleged that the transfer was done with the sole intent to avoid payment to a creditor. The court recognized that, as a matter of Illinois law, the actual intent standard of the Fraudulent Transfer Act, 740 ILCS 160/5, does not apply to property transferred by the entirety, and that the trustee was not incorrect to bring its action under 735 ILCS 5/12-112 by means of section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The court further found that the trustee’s complaint sufficiently pleaded facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.

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