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Judge Timothy A. Barnes

13 B 30975,  13 A 01294
Upon the Defendant’s amended motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s adversary complaint objecting to discharge of debt owed to A&H Caring Connections, Inc. (“A&H”) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) and 11 U.S.C. § 727(a), the underlying interest having been assigned to the Plaintiff by A&H and the Defendant seeking dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the grounds that the underlying assignment is void as a matter of public policy and in violation of Illinois law, held: For purposes of testing the sufficiency of the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Defendant has failed to satisfy his burden of showing the complaint is insufficient. The amended motion to dismiss is DENIED.

Judge A. Benjamin Goldgar

13 B 44431 14 A 790

Judge Jack B. Schmetterer

In re Robert J. Meier
June 12, 2015

14 B 10105

In re Robert J. Meier
April 3, 2015

14 B 10105

Judge Carol A. Doyle

Judge Jacqueline P. Cox

12  B 24676, 14 A 00392
In this Chapter 7 adversary proceeding, the Trustee filed an Amended Adversary Complaint seeking to avoid and recover transfers made in connection with a commercial mortgage-backed securitization transaction. The Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that certain of the transfers were covered by the safe harbor provision of 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).  In response, the Trustee argued that the safe harbor provision did not apply because the transactions at issue involved a two-tiered commercial mortgage loan transaction. The Trustee also disputed that the recipient was a financial institution.  The Court decided in favor of the Defendants, noting that the transactions at issue fit squarely within the broad definition of a securities contract as defined by § 741(7)(A) and used in § 546(e).

Because the parties did not consent to the Court’s entry of a final order on the fraudulent transfer claims, the Court submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9033.  On the preferential transfer claim, the Court determined that it had both statutory and constitutional authority to enter its order dismissing the claim, with prejudice.

The Court recommended dismissal of the actual fraud transfer claims without prejudice, because those claims were not plead with specificity as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).

Judge Janet S. Baer

In re Sam Callas
April 23, 2015

13 B 43900, 14 A 00719
On the chapter 7 trustee’s motion for authority to turn over certain funds to secured creditor BCL-Capital Funding LLC (“BCL”) as alleged cash collateral proceeds, a creditor (and the Debtor’s former attorney) (“Stern”) objected, arguing that the proceeds were not BCL’s cash collateral and that turnover was, thus, improper.  The trustee contended that he was bound by the terms of a pre-conversion cash collateral order (the “Order”) in which the Debtor and BCL had agreed that certain funds constituted cash collateral.  The Court found that the Order did not, by its terms, foreclose consideration of Stern’s arguments regarding the validity of BCL’s claimed interest in the proceeds because the Order: (1) made no findings regarding whether the funds were cash collateral, and (2) contained broad reservations of rights.  Thus, the Order was found to have no preclusive effect beyond enforcement of the Order itself.  Further, the Court found that, despite an assignment of rents held by BCL, the proceeds were paid to the Debtor before the commencement of the case and while he retained control of the property at issue and that, thus, BCL could assert no interest in the proceeds by virtue of the assignment.  Ultimately, the Court concluded that the proceeds at issue were not BCL’s cash collateral and, accordingly, denied the trustee’s motion.