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Judge Janet S. Baer

16 B 29319, 17 A 00176
Mark Simon filed an adversary complaint against Constantino Joseph Boccarsi and Cari Ann Coglianese (the “Debtors”), seeking a determination that a debt owed to him by the Debtors by virtue of the entry of a state court default judgment was not dischargeable pursuant to §§ 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), and (a)(19).  Simon subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on his securities fraud claim under § 523(a)(19).  He argued that the state court judgment was for securities fraud and that, thus, collateral estoppel barred the relitigation of his claim.  The Debtors contended that neither element required under § 523(a)(19) had been satisfied.  According to the Debtors, they did not commit securities fraud and the fact that the state court judgment was entered in default insulated the judgment from a finding of nondischargeability.  Based on the plain language of the statutory exception, the legislative history, and the reasoning in Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375 (7th Cir. 1994), the Court found that the default judgment had preclusive effect in the nondischargeability action, because § 523(a)(19) preempted common law collateral estoppel.  The Court further found that the undisputed facts demonstrated that the two requirements of § 523(a)(19) had been satisfied through the entry of the judgment in the state judicial proceeding.  As such, the Court granted Simon’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in his favor.

Judge Jack B. Schmetterer

In re Charnette Walker
December 12, 2017

17 B 33957

In re Frank Villasenor
December 5, 2017

17 B 15830

17 B 18090

Judge Timothy A. Barnes

In re Jennifer Robinson
December 4, 2017

17 B 12405
Upon a tax purchaser’s motion for relief from stay in a chapter 13 case, arguing that the expiration of the state-law period for redeeming taxes prior to the debtor filing for bankruptcy case gives cause to modify the stay, held: The tax purchaser has not established the necessary elements of section 362(d)(1) or (d)(2) to be granted relief from stay. Because the tax purchaser has not obtained a tax deed, under Illinois law, the debtor remains the owner of the underlying real property even though the redemption period has expired prior to the commencement of the debtor’s case. The debtor therefore has the right to attempt to treat the tax purchaser’s claim and the debtor’s property in a chapter 13 plan. The existence of that right, under the facts at bar, trumps the tax purchaser’s desire to bolster its claim postpetition by acts proscribed by the automatic stay. The motion for relief from stay is, therefore, DENIED.

Judge Deborah L. Thorne

16 B 39654

Judge Jacqueline P. Cox

In re Demetrius Adger
September 20, 2017

17 B 20163
The issue was whether Debtor Adger's filing of a Chapter 13 case on July 5, 2017 at 6:26 p.m., rather than before 5 p.m. when the Cook County Clerk's office closed was filed timely  for purposes of allowing the debtor to treat a tax purchaser's claim over the life of a Chapter 13 plan.   The court analyzed  the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Illinois Supreme Court's Electronic Filing Standards and Principles and our local Bankruptcy Court's Administrative Procedures for CM/ECF  that govern electronic filing. Generally those Rules and Standards provide that a document filed on the due date before midnight is timely filed.  The Amended Motion to Modify Automatic Stay was denied.

09 B 49112, 17 A 00280
The Debtor sued Wells Fargo Home Mortgage alleging that it violated the discharge injunction when it sent her three informational letters concerning its lien. The court found that the creditor did no more than what Bankruptcy Code Section 524(j) allows mortgagees to do post-discharge: communicate with debtors to maintain periodic payments on residential property in lieu of the creditor pursuing in rem relief to enforce the lien.