You are here
Judge Jacqueline P. Cox - Opinions
Description | Date Issued |
---|---|
In re Ollistine M. Jude-Weathersby 24 BK 03393 |
01/14/2025 |
In re Shelia Gore 24 BK 03127 |
08/15/2024 |
Coast to Coast Leasing, LLC vs. M&T Equipment Finance Corporation, et al (In re Coast to Coast Leasing, LLC) 24 BK 03056, 24 AP 00172 |
07/17/2024 |
In re We’ll Clean Incorporated 24 BK 00151 Pre-petition, the creditors had extended loans to the Debtor, its President/sole shareholder, and a related entity (collectively, the “borrowers”). Following the borrowers’ default, the lending creditors sued the borrowers and third parties that had allegedly offered the Debtor’s President debt counseling services. The third parties included the current owner of the car wash—a corporation called Avalon—and its managers, two individuals. The creditors alleged the Debtor’s President and the third parties had engaged in a fraudulent scheme to interfere with debt negotiations between the creditors and borrowers and transferred the assets of the car wash business to the non-Debtor third parties to avoid the borrowers’ liability under the loans. The creditors brought the successor liability claim against Avalon, the corporate successor and current owner of the car wash; they asserted the fraud exception to Illinois’ general rule of successor corporate nonliability applied, arguing that Avalon should be held liable for payment of the loans due to its managers’ involvement in said fraudulent scheme. The court agreed with the objecting creditors, holding that the Trustee could not assert the successor liability claim, but for a different reason. The court reasoned that the successor liability claim was a claim that was personal to the lending creditors, since it was for breach of loan agreements that were not common to all creditors, relying on Koch Ref. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339, 1348-49 (7th Cir. 1987). Since the lending creditors had also alleged that some of the Debtor’s President’s actions in facilitating the transfer of the car were taken under duress, the court found that whether in pari delictoapplied was more appropriately resolvable in state court by a judge or jury. |
05/21/2024 |
H & H Fast Properties, Inc. v. Toorak Capital Partners, LLC (In re H & H Fast Properties, Inc.) 23 BK 16874, 24 AP 00020 The court reasoned the state court judgment did not and could not impair this court’s jurisdiction, since the state court had denied the Creditor’s request to enter a finding pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a). The judgment against the principal could not be enforced or appealed until the resolution of all claims. The action was stayed as to the Debtor (the borrower under the loan) upon it filing for bankruptcy relief. The court reasoned the Debtor could show a likelihood of success on the merits, since, although it was early in the case, there were no apparent barriers to confirmation. However, it could not show an injunction would serve the public interest because the Debtor did not need a stay, since the judgment against its principal could not presently be enforced. |
03/18/2024 |
In re Dennis Molnar 19 BK 09525 |
02/15/2024 |
Jones v. City of Chicago (In re Tony R. Jones) 22 AP 00206, 16 BK 26076 The court granted the City’s motion to dismiss with prejudice, finding the Debtor (and class plaintiffs) lacked standing because he did not credibly allege he (or the other plaintiffs) had an interest in the vehicle by claiming an exemption and could not show that the vehicle was abandoned to him under § 554 prior to the closure of the Chapter 7 case. The court found the Debtor (and class plaintiffs) failed to state a claim because while the case was pending, the vehicle belonged to the bankruptcy estate and the City was not obligated to turn it over to the debtor. When the case ended, the City’s lien survived the debtor’s discharge; the City rightfully maintained possession of the vehicle. The court also found that state court would be a more appropriate forum to rule on the validity of the City’s claim that it held a possessory lien. |
02/15/2024 |
In re Peking Duck USA, Inc 23 BK 05135 |
01/04/2024 |
In re First Premier Funding, LLC 23 BK 00811 The court dismissed the later filed case on res judicata grounds and for having been filed in bad faith as a litigation tactic where Capital Equity Land Trust’s appeal of the tax deed proceeding was appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court while its beneficiary’s subsequent case proceeded in the bankruptcy court. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the land trust’s Petition for Leave to Appeal. |
09/29/2023 |
Silver-Hacker v. Allen (In re Sarah Allen) 20 BK 05391, 20 AP 00214 In a prior ruling, this court granted the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in part, holding that based on collateral estoppel grounds, (1) the Debtor caused an “injury” for purposes of § 523(a)(6) and (2) the probate court’s findings about the amount of the debt precluded re-litigation of those issues; however, the court denied the motion in part, finding that a trial was necessary to determine whether the Debtor acted willfully and maliciously under § 523(a)(6) when she failed to return the items at issue. At trial, both parties testified that the Plaintiff’s son was an artist who was living with the Defendant-Debtor in the Plaintiff’s home when he died; upon his passing, the Plaintiff asked the Defendant-Debtor to move out so she could sell the residence, which made the Debtor angry. Two days after asking the Defendant-Debtor to move out, the Plaintiff testified that she discovered that artwork her son had made, among other items, were gone. The Defendant-Debtor admitted taking the items and testified that she sought help from Facebook friends to remove the items and did not keep records of which items were taken or where they were stored. The Plaintiff testified that the Defendant-Debtor returned some of the items but held on to the “important” ones (the artwork), and that the Plaintiff explained how important the missing artwork was to her. Both parties testified that, after the Plaintiff instituted a Citation to discover assets proceeding for conversion of personal property in probate court, the probate court issued multiple court orders finding that, inter alia, the items in dispute belonged to the Plaintiff and ordering the Defendant-Debtor to return them. Based on the Plaintiff’s testimony showing the Defendant-Debtor’s anger she expressed when told to vacate the premise and that the Defendant-Debtor held onto the important items despite knowing how important they were to the Plaintiff, the Defendant-Debtor’s disobedience of multiple court orders requiring her to return the missing artwork, and the Defendant-Debtor’s testimony that she took the items to feel closer to the decedent, the court found her conversion of the items constituted a non-dischargeable “willful and malicious injury” under § 523(a)(6). The court found that she acted intentionally because she took the items belonging to the probate estate without legal justification and acted with a malicious intent, since she kept the important items despite her knowledge of their importance to the Plaintiff, putting her own comfort and interests above the Plaintiff’s. |
08/11/2023 |
In re Todd T. Malmborg 22 BK 06603 |
05/04/2023 |
In re Capital Equity Land Tr., No. 2140215, No. 22-2580 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2022) 22-2580 The Debtor is an Illinois land trust, an arrangement under which the legal and equitable title to real estate is held by a trustee and the interest of the beneficiary is personal property. The beneficiary has power to direct the trustee in dealing with the property and the right to the property’s profits. Bankruptcy Code section 109 covers who may be a debtor. Section 109(d)states only a “person” that may be a debtor under chapter 7 may be a debtor under chapter 11. A “person” includes corporations as provided for in Bankruptcy Code section 101(41). Bankruptcy Code section 101(9) informs that the term corporation includes certain associations, partnerships, joint-stock companies and business trusts. The Debtor has not asserted that it conducted any business activities pre-bankruptcy; it stated that if it regains the property (through its adversary proceeding 22 AP 00037) it will lease it. Case law generally holds that land trusts do not conduct business activity and for that reason are not eligible for chapter 11 bankruptcy relief as business trusts. The bankruptcy case was dismissed for ineligibility and because its filing was a litigation tactic, lacking good faith. The related adversary proceeding was also dismissed. |
11/17/2022 |
Caren A. Asher v. John J. Petti (In re John J. Petti and Denise A. Petti) 19 BK 00667, 19 AP 00592 She alleged she was induced into loaning $600,000 and entering the business because the Debtor made the following misrepresentations: (1) the brewery would retain distribution rights to Cook County, Illinois; (2) the Plaintiff would be appointed a Class A member of the brewery and she would review all decisions, including who retains distribution rights; and (3) the Debtor would personally guarantee the loan. She testified that the Debtor gave away the Cook County distribution rights to a distributor behind her back without her permission and because these rights were not retained, potential investors backed out. The Defendant-Debtor testified that it was not possible to self-distribute in Cook County because after the Plaintiff stopped funding the business, it lacked sufficient funds for marketing, advertising, employees, and truck drivers necessary for self-distribution. The court ruled against the Plaintiff, and in favor of the Defendant, finding the debt was dischargeable because the Plaintiff could not meet her burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an exception to discharge applied. Regarding her fraud allegation under § 523(a)(2)(A), she could not show the Debtor made any false representations about the Cook County distribution rights, how the business would be run, or otherwise, since the evidence did not support her allegations. Regarding her § 523(a)(4) claim, she could not show an implied fiduciary relationship existed because their contract and testimony suggested the Plaintiff had at least as much power as the Debtor, if not more. Regarding her § 523(a)(6) claim, she could not show a “deliberate or intentional injury”: it was unclear that the Defendant intentionally filed the documents that allegedly gave away the distribution rights and the parties disputed whether the Plaintiff had the right to approve any and all contracts. |
08/31/2022 |
In re 318 Retail, LLC 22 BK 02485 |
07/28/2022 |
In re Renee Julia Liss 10-11690 |
07/21/2022 |
In re 318 Retail, LLC 22 BK 02485 (Involuntary) |
05/27/2022 |
Trustee v. Brown, Udell, Pomerantz & Delrahim, Ltd. (In re Michael S. Helmstetter) 19 BK 28687, 22 AP 00019 |
05/19/2022 |
In re Gordon Green 21 B 06189 |
03/09/2022 |
In re Robert M. Kowalski 18 BK 09130 |
11/12/2021 |
Paloian v. Byline Bancorp, Inc. et al. (In re Robert M. Kowalski) 18 BK 09130, 19 AP 00626 |
10/13/2021 |