The District of Northern Illinois offers a database of opinions for the years 1999 to 2013, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.

Subscribe to All Opinions

In re Victor J. Fini
February 6, 2015

13 B 47450

Judge A. Benjamin Goldgar

14 B 29989

Judge Carol A. Doyle

Judge Jacqueline P. Cox

11 B 41826
In this post-confirmation Chapter 11 proceeding, Michael Bahary & Steven Bahary Partnership (“the Reorganized Debtor”) filed a Motion for a Rule to Show Cause requiring Napleton Enterprises, LLC (“Napleton”) and its counsel to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for suing to enforce Napleton’s purported Right of First Refusal as to certain real property (the "Grand Avenue Property") in a state court action regarding transactions that ensued in this bankruptcy case in 2012. The Reorganized Debtor asserted that Napleton’s actions were inconsistent with the terms of the confirmed Amended Plan of Reorganization and in violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s discharge injunction, set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).  
Pursuant to the Reorganized Debtor's Confirmed Plan, the Reorganized Debtor surrendered the Grand Avenue Property to Banco Popular by executing a Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure to satisfy Banco Popular’s secured claim. Napleton was not scheduled as a creditor in the Reorganized Debtor’s bankruptcy.
In the offending state court action, Napleton alleged that its Right of First Refusal was an executory contract that survived confirmation of the Plan because its claim was not scheduled therein by the Debtor and it did not get notice of the bankruptcy case.  Napleton also asserted that the Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure was a “bona fide” offer that gave it a basis to exercise its Right of First Refusal.  
The Court issued the Rule to Show Cause, and determined that although Napleton was not included in the Debtor’s bankruptcy schedules, Napleton is neither a debtor, a trustee, an indenture trustee nor a creditor to whom a debt is owed as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101 (10) (creditor is defined as an entity who holds a claim against the debtor or the bankruptcy estate).  Napleton is neither a creditor/claim holder nor a party to an executory contract because its Right of First Refusal remained inchoate because no third party made a bona fide offer, which it could match within five days.  
The Court denied Napleton’s request to alter or amend its prior December 29, 2014 judgment under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024.


13 B 29753, 14 A 00674
In this Chapter 13 adversary proceeding, the Debtor-Plaintiff, Samuel Brimmage, alleges that the Defendants, Quatnum3 Group LLC and Elite Recovery Acquisition, LLC, violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by filing a proof of claim on a debt that is otherwise time-barred. Elite Recovery Acquisition is a national debt buyer and Quantum3 Group is its agent.
The Defendants moved to dismiss the adversary proceeding by arguing that 1) filing a proof of claim is not a debt collection action subject to FDCPA and 2) that if it was a debt collection action then it would be impossible to comply with both the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA, and that the Code should therefore control.
The Court denied the motion, concluding that filing a proof of claim is a form of debt collection. The Seventh Circuit has held that while the statutes do overlap, enforcement of both is possible where “any debt collector can comply with both simultaneously.” Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2004). Agreeing with a similar decision out of the Southern District of Indiana, the Court determined that the Defendants could easily comply with both the Code and the FDCPA by simply not filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt. See also Patrick v. PYOD,LLC, 2014 WL 4100414 (S.D.Ind. 2014). As such, the Court will be able to enforce both the FDCPA and the Code in this situation.

Judge Jack B. Schmetterer

Judge Timothy A. Barnes

11 B 41555, 13 A 01243
Upon certain defendants’ motions to dismiss the Trustee’s fraudulent conveyance adversary complaint on statute of limitations grounds, the Trustee argues that it may rely on such longer statute of limitations as may be applicable to the IRS as an actual prepetition creditor of the bankruptcy estate.
  In response, a limited number of the moving defendants jointly move for an order disallowing the IRS’s claim.
In considering the foregoing, held:  With respect to the motion to disallow the claim, adversary defendants qua adversary defendants lack standing to object to claims.  As such, the joint motion to disallow is DENIED.
With respect to the motions to dismiss, for the purposes of testing the sufficiency of the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), transfers occurring more than 2 years prior to the petition date are time-barred under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code and the motions to dismiss will be GRANTED in this respect.  As to the remaining grounds, the court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true, wherein the Trustee has alleged that the IRS is a prepetition creditor of the bankruptcy estate.  That allegation is supported by the actual claim on file by the IRS at the commencement of the adversary.  As the trustee may act within the statute of limitations applicable to any creditor of the estate, including such longer statutes as apply to the IRS, and as the transfers sought to be avoided by the Trustee appear to fall within those longer periods, the court finds for these purposes that the Trustee’s actions are not conclusively time-barred.  The motions to dismiss are therefore DENIED in this respect.  The legal and factual predicates of the defendants’ statute of limitations affirmative defense, including, but not limited to, whether the IRS had an allowable claim against the estate on the petition date, remain issues to be determined on summary judgment or at trial, not in the limited scope of a motion to dismiss, and such arguments are preserved.