Opinions

The District of Northern Illinois offers a database of opinions for the years 1999 to 2013, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.

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Judge Jacqueline P. Cox

09 B 22180,10 A 01051

 Plaintiff filed an adversary proceeding seeking to deny Debtor Steven Artstein (“Debtor”) a discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(2) and 727(a)(4). The Court entered judgment in favor of Debtor on both counts. On Count I, the Court found that Debtor’s failure to disclose his home in his SOFA did not amount to fraud when the home was listed in Debtor’s Schedules A and D. As to Count II, the Court gave credence to Debtor’s testimony regarding certain undisclosed claims and after viewing the errors and omissions in their entirety, the Court held that Debtor did not knowingly and fraudulently make false oaths.

10 B 26209,1 0 A 02055

In this adversary proceeding, plaintiff sought a determination that a certain debt was nondischargeable pursuant to 11 § U.S.C. 523(a)(6), which provides an exception to discharge for a debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” The debt consisted primarily of an attorney’s fee award in connection with an order of protection case in state court. Because this debt arose out of the willful and malicious injury caused by the debtor, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and held that the attorney’s fees are nondischargeable.

11 B 08863

The Court found that the Creditor’s filing of an Objection to Discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) although deficient in form, was sufficient to constitute a complaint and provided notice that Creditor objected to Debtor’s discharge based on pending sexual assault allegations.

08 B 28225, 10 A 01805

The court denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to four fraudulent conveyance Counts in Trustee Peterson's adversary complaint concerning the Premium Payment Debtors' payment of nearly $6,000,000 for insurance against the risk of certain retailers becoming insolvent. It was later revealed that Certain Petters Entities were operating a Ponzi Scheme and that the accounts receivable being insured did not exist. The court relied on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in Leibowitz v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. ( In re Image Worldwide, Ltd .), 139 F.3d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 1998) in finding that such matters are issues of fact which cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss. Trustee Peterson requested rescission based on lack of consideration. The court dismissed the two rescission Counts without prejudice. The court ruled that rescission was not available as to Counts V and VI because the Premium Payment Debtors were provided with consideration in the form of insurance coverage. The Motion to Dismiss was granted with prejudice as to the Count alleging unjust enrichment. The court ruled that unjust enrichment is a quasi-contract theory of recovery that permits courts to imply the existence of a contract where none exists in order to prevent unjust results. Because the parties had an express contract, unjust enrichment as a theory of recovery is not available.

Judge Pamela S. Hollis

Defendant brought a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' adversary complaint which sought to except certain debts from discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), & (a)(6). Defendant sought a determination that Plaintiffs' complaint was barred by res judicata because of a prior action brought in state court. The court ruled that Plaintiffs were judicially estopped from denying a final judgment had been entered in the state court as Plaintiffs had engaged in supplementary proceedings, treating the judgment as final. Summary judgment was granted in favor of Defendant on Counts I and II. Defendant did not succeed on Count III because Plaintiffs did receive a judgment which could support a willful and malicious injury.

Creditor objected to approval of disclosure statement where plan contemplated using rents from apartment complex after the automatic stay had been lifted with respect to the apartment complex and creditor had asserted its right to take possession of the apartment complex and the rents. Creditor’s objection was sustained on the basis that the rents were no longer property of the estate.

Judge Jack B. Schmetterer

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