07 B 00565
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Judge A. Benjamin Goldgar
September 2, 2015
August 25, 2015
13 B 31151
July 29, 2015
13 B 31151
July 22, 2015
15 B 1145, 15 A 00149
Judge Janet S. Baer
August 31, 2015
09 B 30029
Debtors’ financial advisor FBR Capital Markets & Co. (“FBR”) filed an amended application for compensation, which included a request for a restructuring fee and reimbursement of expenses, the majority of which were attorneys’ fees incurred in defense of FBR’s fee request. Plan transferee Bletchley Hotel at O’Hare LLC (“Bletchley”) filed an objection, asking the Court to: (1) reconsider its prior decision, which found that FBR was entitled to the restructuring fee, and (2) deny or substantially reduce both the restructuring fee and the requested attorneys’ fees for work performed in defending the original fee application. As to the restructuring fee, the Court denied the request for reconsideration because Bletchley primarily rehashed arguments already considered and rejected in the prior proceeding and, thus, failed to sustain its burden under Rule 60(b). The Court further found that, based on the express language of the governing documents, the restructuring fee was subject to review under the improvidence standard of § 328(a) and that the requested amount of the fee would not be reduced because Bletchley failed to identify any developments incapable of being anticipated at the time the order approving FBR’s retention was entered. As to the reimbursement of expenses, the Court found that FBR is not entitled to the attorneys’ fees incurred for fee-defense work because the reimbursement under the pre-approved engagement letter is subject to review under § 330 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC held that § 330(a)(1) does not allow a bankruptcy court to award attorneys’ fees for work performed in defending a fee application. Accordingly, the Court awarded FBR a restructuring fee in the requested amount of $2,568,145.89 and reimbursement of expenses not related to the defense of FBR’s fees in the amount of $62,466.60.
Judge Timothy A. Barnes
August 7, 2015
14 B 42906
Upon the chapter 7 Trustee’s objections to the Debtor’s claimed exemptions in (1) installment payments under a personal injury settlement agreement and (2) proceeds from a life insurance policy received post-petition following the death of the Debtor’s step-father, held: Under the terms of the marital settlement agreement, entered into by and between the Debtor and his ex-wife and incorporated into the state court divorce decree, the Debtor’s limited interest in and control over the installment payments is insufficient to bring the installment payments into the estate, therefore, the Trustee’s objection to the Debtor’s exemption in the personal injury settlement is OVERRULED. With respect to the life insurance proceeds, however, the Debtor has failed to establish that he is “dependent upon the insured” for the purposes of 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(f) and, therefore, cannot claim an exemption in the life insurance proceeds, thus, the Trustee’s objection to the Debtor’s exemption in the life insurance proceeds is SUSTAINED.
July 17, 2015
Upon an objection to confirmation of the debtor’s chapter 13 plan, wherein a creditor alleged that the debtor could not comply with the requirements of “surrender” in section 1325(a)(5)(C) of the United States Bankruptcy Code as the debtor proposed to surrender a vehicle that had been previously stolen and that, therefore, could not be delivered to the creditor, held: “Surrender” in section 1325(a)(5)(C) does not always require the debtor to physically deliver the vehicle. Because the Debtor proposes surrender in good faith, physical delivery is not required. As a result, the creditor’s objection is overruled.
July 13, 2015
10 B 51428
Upon the creditor’s motion to allow claim under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006, wherein the creditor sought to have the court allow its claim as a timely general unsecured claim when the claim was allegedly delivered directly to the office of the clerk of court rather than electronically filed and, despite being tendered to the clerk’s office prior to the claims deadline, not entered on the claims register until almost 4 years after the claims deadline, and where creditor sought to have the court enter an order amending the chapter 7 trustee’s previously approved final report, held: Rule 9006 does not apply to the deadline to file claims in a chapter 7 case. The claim was filed for purposes of Rule 3002 when the claim was entered on the claims register, almost 4 years after the claims deadline. As a result, the claim is a tardily filed unsecured claim which would receive zero distribution even if the final report were to be amended and, thus, the creditor’s motion is denied.
Judge Jacqueline P. Cox
July 14, 2015
13 B 36813
The Court held evidentiary hearings over three days on the objection of the successor lessor of a downtown commercial food court to the claims for rejection damages filed by certain food court tenants to determine the amount of damages due to them pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) and (h). The Court also considered the good faith and fair dealing doctrine under Illinois contract law regarding the timing of the formation of the leases and the rejection of the leases under the Code as some of the leases were entered into within only a few months, weeks, or even days in the case of two tenants, before the motion to reject them was filed.
As of the petition date, Debtor Dearborn Retail, LLC, owned the food court space located at 201 N. Clark Street in Chicago. Subsequently, Garvey Court, LLC, an entity controlled by Bighorn Capital, Inc. acquired the property. The Court granted Debtor’s motion, in connection with the acquisition, to reject the leases of eighteen food court tenants. As part of the rejection order, Garvey Court agreed to assume the obligations, if any, to pay damages and/or termination fees that resulted from such rejections. Neither Debtor nor Garvey Court issued a notice of early termination pursuant to the leases.
Under the terms of an agreed claims resolution order, an evidentiary hearing was held to determine the amount of damages owed to tenants whose claims were not settled. Nine of the eighteen tenants filed proofs of claim, to which Garvey Court objected; one tenant settled before the hearing. The claimants generally sought damages for build-out costs, replacement rent, advertising/promotion for the new locations, moving costs, return of security deposits and attorneys’ fees. Garvey Court argued that the claimants could not recover any damages because of their failure to pay rent and the resulting termination of the leases because of such default. Alternatively, Garvey Court generally sought to limit the build-out and replacement rent damages to only a two-year period pursuant to the early termination provision.
The Court found that the rejection damages were not limited by the early termination provision because it was never triggered. The Court also found that build-out costs, replacement rent, etc. were the proximate result of the lease rejections. Individual orders were entered for each tenant.
July 9, 2015
14 MP 90007
The United States Trustee filed a Statement of Charges against Attorney Al-Haroon Husain charging him with violating applicable disciplinary rules by systematically altering documents, reusing debtors’ signatures, signing documents on behalf of clients and causing clients to sign incomplete documents. After a five-day hearing, the Court found that the U.S. Trustee proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Husain has committed the violations as charged.
Mr. Husain will be permanently suspended from the practice of law before the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois due to the nature and extent of his misconduct. The suspension is effective July 31, 2015 at 5:00 p.m. Mr. Husain is also ordered to refund the fees received from the clients listed in the Memorandum Opinion.
The Order will be reported to the Executive Committee of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and to the Illinois Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission.